Abstract. In this paper we propose a general definition of secrecy for cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model. We give a sufficient condition ensuring secrecy for protocols where rules have encryption depth at most two, that is satisfied by almost all practical protocols. The only allowed primitives in the class of protocols we consider are pairing and encryption with atomic keys. Moreover, we describe an algorithm of practical interest which transforms a cryptographic protocol into a secure one from the point of view of secrecy, without changing its original goal with respect to secrecy of nonces and keys, provided the protocol satisfies some conditions. These conditions are not very restrictive and are satisfied for most practical protocols.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are used to ensure secure communications between two or more parties in a distributed system. Among the requirements that cryptographic protocols must satisfy are the well-known authentication and secrecy or confidentiality.
Security protocol design and verification is a very hard problem. Sources of difficulty are numerous and of different types. The seminal paper for developing a model was proposed by D. Dolev and A.C. Yao. [DY83] . In recent years a lot of methods have been proposed for reasoning about cryptographic protocols. Some of them are based on the trace model [Pau98,JG02] including models with an explicit state-transition system [CDL + 99] or Horn clauses [Bla01, CCM01] . Another type of model uses processes to represent cryptographic protocols [AG00, Sch97] .
Concerning secrecy there are basically two approaches, the first one reduces the secrecy property to a reachability problem, the second one defines secrecy in terms of an observability equivalence.
Most of the papers are devoted to decidability and undecidability results depending on various hypothesis related to the boundedness of nonces and sessions, the used cryptographic primitives and so on. See for example [DLMS04] for a review of these results. Surprisingly, there are very few results that give some rules to apply in order to guarantee the secrecy property. This question has already been answered in the case of cryptographic protocols using symmetric keys in [Bea04] , which gives a sufficient condition for solving this problem. Here we consider a more general class of cryptographic protocols using both symmetric and asymmetric keys. We give a new sufficient condition adapted to this type of protocols and we describe an algorithm of practical interest. It transforms a cryptographic protocol (satisfying a condition which is not very restrictive) into a secure one from the point of view of secrecy, without changing its original goal with respect to secrecy of nonces and keys. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 gives the sufficient condition for a secure protocol w.r.t secrecy, Section 4 is devoted to the algorithm which transforms a cryptographic protocol into a secure one w.r.t secrecy. The last section concludes. Related work As mentioned before, the security literature concentrates more on the verification of cryptographic protocols comparing to the synthesis of correct protocols. In [AN96] , some prudent principles for designing protocols are given but do not guarantee the success. Several of these principles are present in our definition of well composed protocol. A sufficient condition based on typing is presented in [Aba99] but it concerns only symmetric keys and a binary view of secrecy according to which the world is divided into system and attacker. Our sufficient condition can be considered as a generalization of the sufficient condition given in [Low95] . Indeed, the protocols which are considered in this paper do not admit forwarding, which is an important restriction. At last, to our knowledge, there is no paper which describes an algorithm which transforms a protocol into a secure one w.r.t. secrecy and preserves its original goal.
The model
In this section we formalize the model we use and we specify the assumptions we make about protocols commonly referred to as the "Dolev-Yao model". Our approach is largely inspired by [Low99] . The only primitives used are pairing and encryption. We assume that pairing is associative, which corresponds to practical protocols, so the algebra of terms is the quotient of a free algebra with equations for associativity.
We are interested in the behavior of the protocol when the number of agents, nonces and sessions is unbounded. Moreover the hypothesis on the power of honest agents is as weak as possible. The knowledge of an agent is local, it does not have a global memory of all its sessions. On the contrary the power of the intruder is maximal.
Let T be a set of terms and A be an agent variable. The set Synth A (T ) is the least set of terms containing T and satisfying:
-τ 1 , ..., τ p ∈ Synth A (T ) ⇒< τ 1 , ..., τ p >∈ Synth A (T ) (An agent can compose the terms he knows). -∀τ ∈ Synth A (T ), ∀B ∈ AgV ar
• {τ } K(A,B) ∈ Synth A (T ) (An agent can encrypt with a symmetric key he shares with another agent) • {τ } Kpriv(A) ∈ Synth A (T ) (An agent can encrypt with his own private key).
• {τ } K pub (B) ∈ Synth A (T ) (An agent can encrypt with the public key of any agent). -∀τ ∈ Synth A (T ) and for all short term key variable K ∈ T , {τ } K ∈ Synth A (T ) (An agent can encrypt with all encrypting short term key he knows).
Let A be an agent variable. Let T and T ′ be two sets of terms. We have T Anal A T ′ if one of the following properties holds:
-{τ } K ∈ T , K ∈ T is a symmetric session key variable, and T ′ = (T \ {τ } K ) ∪ {τ } (An agent can decrypt terms encrypted with a short term session key he knows).
)∪{τ } (An agent can decrypt terms encrypted with a key shared with an agent he knows.) -{τ } K pub (A) ∈ T and T ′ = (T \{τ } K pub (A) )∪{τ } (An agent can decrypt terms encrypted with his own public key).
-{τ } Kpriv(B) ∈ T , B ∈ T and T ′ = (T \ {τ } Kpriv (B) ) ∪ {τ } (An agent can decrypt terms encrypted with the private key of an agent he knows).
A set of terms T is told undecomposable if there does not exist any set of term T ′ such that T Anal A T ′ (An agent cannot decompose any more term). It is easy to prove that for any set of terms T , there exists a unique undecomposable set of terms
For a term τ ∈ Anal * A (T ) we define the number of steps necessary for A to learn τ from T as the number of decryption operations that A must use before obtaining τ , more precisely :
-A learns τ from T in 0 step iff some term < ..., τ, ... > is in T ( we admit here a composition of a single element τ ). (No decryption necessary). -if A learns {< ..., τ, ... >} K from T in at most p steps and K is a short session symmetric key learnt by A from T in at most q steps, then τ is learnt by A from T in at most p + q + 1 steps. -if A learns {< ..., τ, ... >} K(A,B) from T in at most p steps and B is learnt by A from T in at most q steps, then τ is learnt by A from T in at most p + q + 1 steps.
-if A learns {< ..., τ, ... >} K pub (A) from T in at most p steps then τ is learnt by A from T in at most p + 1 steps. -if A learns {< ..., τ, ... >} Kpriv(B) from T in at most p steps and B is learnt by A from T in at most q steps, then τ is learnt by A from T in at most p + q + 1 steps.
For τ, τ ′ ∈ Anal * A (T ) we define that A learns τ from T before τ ′ if A learns τ in p steps, τ ′ in p ′ steps and p < p ′ . Now, given a concrete agent a, we can define in the same way a relation Anal a on finite sets of concrete terms as well as the other notions defined above, replacing agents, and keys variables by values of the corresponding type. A protocol template or simply protocol is a sequence of message templates. A role in a protocol template is an agent variable appearing in this protocol. Given a protocol P with a set of roles R, a session template Ses A for role A ∈ R is the subsequence of message templates of P in which role A is sender or receiver. Our running example will be the protocol TMN [TMN90] using asymmetric keys. Brackets for pairing are omitted as usual.
Ses S is the entire protocol. Ses A is the sequence:
Realizable protocol template
An elementary question is whether a protocol is "realizable", i.e. whether the honest agents can execute it. This notion appears in [RS03] as "well-formed" protocol. We formalize this notion in our framework and give an algorithm which checks whether a protocol is realizable or not. One can observe that as far as we are aware of, most of the undecidability proofs [DLMS99,AC02a,AC02b] are based on protocols which are not realizable, which is a weakness of these proofs. Only in [CCM01] the undecidability proof relies on realizable protocols. Let P be a protocol, and A be a role of this protocol. Consider the sequence of t-messages of the session template Ses A . The j th t-message of Ses A is of form (A, B j , τ j ) or (B j , A, τ j ) depending on A is sender or receiver of the message. We define Kn A,j as the knowledge of role A after execution of message number j. That is to say as the set of terms known by A after the execution of the first j t-messages of his session and that A can no more decompose. This knowledge can be decomposed into two subsets:
-The basic knowledge of A at step j, BasKn A,j , which contains agent, nonce and key variables. -The cryptographic knowledge of A at step j, CrKn A,j , which contains the encrypted terms known by A at step j and he cannot decrypt.
Notice that Kn A,j contains only terms which are component templates. From the definition of synthesis, we can define Synth A (Kn A,j ) as the set of terms that A can build from his knowledge at step j.
Let us define by induction on j the set Kn A,j and the fact that the j first messages of Ses A are realizable.
The initial knowledge of A, Kn A,0 is fixed by the protocol. We need to introduce the notion of new variables appearing in a t-message of protocol P . Let (A p , B p , τ p ) be the p th t-message of P . The set of new variables of this t-message denoted N ewV ar p is defined recursively:
Let j > 0 and suppose that the first (j − 1) messages are realizable by A and Kn A,j−1 is defined, then:
-If in message number j, A is receiver, this message can be realized by A since A is passive in this action. -If message number j is of the form (A, B j , τ j ), this message can be realized by A if and only if: τ j ∈ Synth A (Kn A,j−1 ∪ N ewV ar pj ) where p j is the index of the message (A, B j , τ j ) in P .
In both cases, we have :
. A session template Ses A is realizable if all its t-messages in this session are realizable by role A. A protocol is realizable if all the session templates of all roles of the protocol are realizable. Clearly, the above procedure is effective so one can decide whether a protocol is realizable. For example on the TMN protocol with public key of the server, the evolution of the knowledge for each role is :
By now, we will consider only realizable protocols.
2.3
States. Transitions
We formulate now the semantics of a protocol as an infinite transition system where a state contains the set of current partial sessions of agents (it is actually
a multiset because the same agent may have several "identical" partial sessions at the same time) and a transition corresponds to a send or a receive event. As in [Low95] we assume that every message is intercepted by the intruder, so w.l.o.g. one consider that every sent message is sent to the intruder, and every received message is received from the intruder, so we have two types of events the send and receive ones.
States A valuation v of a set of component template T is a function that associates to each term τ ∈ T a concrete termτ = v(τ ), the value of which is in V alue (i.e. to each component template is associated its value). We consider here constants as variables for which the valuation is fixed. Let (τ j ) j=1,...,k be the list of contents of the t-messages of the session of a role A for a protocol P . Let v j be a valuation for Kn A,j . We denote τ j [v j ] the concrete term we obtain when substituting in term τ j to each maximal subterm τ ′ which is in Kn A,j the value v j (τ ′ ). One can remark that τ j is built in a unique way from its maximal subterms which are in Kn A,j . A partial session (or simply session) σ is determined by its length l, a role A and a valuation v l (A) for the knowledge Kn A,l . The role of session σ will be denoted R σ . The role A, the length l and the valuation v l permit to define the list of the l first messages received by the agent playing this role in this session. It is the list of concrete messages (τ j [v]) j=1,...,p≤k , where (τ j ) j=1,...,k is the list of the t-messages of the session of role A. A state is a multiset of partial sessions like in [CDL + 99].
Transitions The formalization of the evolution of the state of the system via receive or send events is the most delicate part of the modeling. An admissible state is a state reachable from the initial state using transitions labeled by the following events: The knowledge of the intruder denoted IntrKn, is the set of values known by the intruder and that he cannot decompose more. It will be described more precisely below.
• Send transitions We have a transition from state S to state S ′ labeled by the send event
\ BasKn Rσ,l ) must satisfy the rules -The values are of the correct type, i.e. values for nonces, agents and short term keys belong to the respective sets respectively N once, Agent, Key.
-The valuation is injective on the set of nonces and the set of keys, and values are "fresh", i.e., if X is a variable for a nonce (resp. a key) belonging to BasKn Rσ,l+1 \ BasKn Rσ,l , then v l+1 (X) is not in the set of valuations of nonce variables (resp. key variables) for all the partial sessions of state S. 2. There exists in S a partial session σ = (l, A, v l ) for which the next message is a receive event, or (case l = 0) agent a starts a partial session for a role A in which the first message of Ses A is a message received by A.
where v l+1 is a valuation defined as follows:
\ BasKn Rσ,l ) must satisfy the rules -values belong to the set Synth I (S) defined above.
-values of agent variables belong to Agent.
′ is the state we obtain when replacing an exemplary of partial session σ with σ ′ = (l + 1, A, v l+1 ). (It corresponds to increasing the list of concrete messages of the partial session σ with the concrete message (b, a, m) .
The knowledge of the intruder I at state S ′ is :
The set Synth I (S) is the set of concrete terms that the intruder can build at state S. It is the least set containing IntrKn S and satisfying:
-τ 1 , ..., τ p ∈ Synth I (S) ⇒< τ 1 , ..., τ p >∈ Synth I (S).
-Agent ⊂ Synth I (S).
-For every agent a, the long term key K(a, I) is in Synth I (S).
-For every agent a, the long term key K pub (a) is in Synth I (S).
-For every term τ ∈ Synth I (S) and for every key K ∈ (IntrKn S ∩ Key), {τ } K ∈ Synth I (S).
A trace of a protocol is a sequence S 0 Remark. One can notice that the rules applied by an honest agent in order to accept a message correspond to a very weak control of the message. The agent makes only equality tests, it has no possibility to control for example the depth of encryption, the correct type of values and so on.
Secrecy
In the literature, generally the definitions of secrecy are very dependent on the chosen model and restrictive, i.e. sufficient for the hypothesis made by the authors but not applicable in a more general context. The definition we give here seems very general, at least as far as the concern is the secrecy of values and not of properties. 
. I does not belong to the valuation v l (R) (I does not participate to the partial session σ from the point of view of
As one can observe, the notion of secrecy implies two parameters: a variable for which the secret is broken and a role which can claim the fact. We have to justify points 1 and 2. Why should the set R be in BasKn A,l ? Because as far as the agent involved in the partial session σ does not know all its partners in this session, it cannot claim whether it is correct that the agent I knows the value v l (X). Indeed, if I participates in an honest way to the session it is normal that v l (X) ∈ IntrKn S . For the same reason the condition that I does not belong to the valuation v l (R) is required. An unsolved question is how to define secrecy in the case when the set of roles does not belong to the knowledge of each role at the end of its partial session. There is a well-known attack [LR97] on the protocol TMN of Example 1. An intruder I A acts as if it was A:
In this attack, the secret is broken for the variable K b from the point of view of B because the trace given here reaches a state containing a partial session for role B satisfying the above three conditions. Given a protocol, the variables which can be learnt by an external observer of the protocol are called revealed variables. The others (those which remain unaccessible to this observer) are called unrevealed variables.
More precisely, given a protocol P = (A i , B i , M i ) i=1,...,k , a variable X for a nonce or a key is revealed in P if X ∈ Anal * C ({M 1 , ..., M k }) for some C not being a role of P . The set of revealed variables of a protocol is clearly computable. In an obvious way, the secret can be broken for every revealed variable from the point of view of every role. Thus, the interesting question is "can the secret be broken for an unrevealed variable". The next section answers to this question by giving a sufficient condition which guarantees that the protocol preserves the secrecy of unrevealed variables for nonces and short term key variables.
A sufficient condition for secrecy

Well-Composed Protocol
A signature of a protocol is constituted by a nonce variable which is called the session nonce and a fixed list of the agent roles < n, A 1 , ..., A p >. Let us comment the four given conditions. Condition (4) helps to prevent the intruder from passing off a term {τ } K as a term {τ ′ } K ′ while these terms are intended to be distinct terms in the specification. Another way to obtain the same effect would be to use tagging as it is done in several papers [BP03,HLS00,RS03]. In these papers, tagging is used to prove decidability of secrecy for tagged protocols, but it is not a sufficient condition for secrecy. Condition (3) is reasonable and permits to know at each moment who is supposed to be implied in the session. An attack on TMN protocol is due to the fact that this condition is not satisfied. Condition (2) is always recommended [AN96] . At last, condition (1) is not essential here. We are convinced that this hypothesis could be relaxed, but it would make the proof more complicated. The TMN protocol is not well composed. Here is a modified version which is well composed:
The attack presented in the previous section fails in this new version because the intruder cannot impersonate A at the first step of the attack.
Theorem 1. A well composed protocol preserves the secrecy of unrevealed variables for nonces and short term key variables.
Before giving the proof of this theorem let us recall the sufficient condition given in [Bea04] to preserve secrecy in case of symmetric encryption, and show with a counter example that this condition is not enough for protocols involving asymmetric encryption. This sufficient condition was:
1. Encryption is of depth one. 2. Long term keys are never transmitted. 3. There exists a signature S such that every subterm of the protocol which is an encrypted term has the form {< S, ... >} K (it contains the signature on the left inside the encryption).
Here is a variant of TMN protocol which satisfies this condition. Let S =< N, A, B > where N is a nonce.
Clearly, an attack similar to the one given before can be repeated. The next proposition expresses the fact that a well composed protocol guarantees some authenticity: if an agent a receives in a partial session where it plays role A a message m from another agent b and a thinks that b plays role B and that m corresponds to the message number i of the protocol, indeed b has sent this message for this purpose. Proof. If a accepts the message, it means that the message is of the right form, namely : (b, a, τ ) with τ =< s 1 , {s 1 , τ ′ } Kpriv(b) >. Actually τ must be encrypted by K priv (b) since it is supposed to have been sent by b. Moreover, a controls that the signature located in the first elements of τ is the same as the signature contained at the beginning of the encrypted element. As a consequence, b is the agent who encrypted τ . Due to the last condition of the definition of a well composed protocol, a also controls that the number of elements in τ corresponds to the number of elements awaited by a in this session, so necessarily, b built τ to send a message number l + 1 for the role A, and this role is played by a because a has in the signature the place corresponding to role A.
We now translate in an equivalent form the property of secrecy for a well composed protocol. Let r be a run with a length l, X be an unrevealed variable for a nonce or a short key, x be a value, T be a time less than or equal to l, and t be a positive integer. The tuple (r, X, x, T, t) satisfies P 1 (resp. P 2 ) iff:
-P 1 : in r at some time T ′ < T , in one of its partial sessions whose signature does not contain I, an honest agent a generates the value x to assign to the unrevealed variable X and at time T , I learns the value x in t steps.
-P 2 : in r, in one of its partial sessions whose signature does not contain I, an honest agent a learns the value x of the unrevealed variable X at time T in t steps and at the end of the run r the value x belongs to the knowledge of I, i.e. x ∈ IntrKn l . Moreover, there is no tuple of the form (r, X ′ , x, T ′ , t ′ ) satisfying P 1 , in other words x is not a value generated by an honest agent to assign to an unrevealed variable. Proof. Firstly assume that there exists an unrevealed variable X for a nonce or a short term key, a value x, a run r with length l, a time T ≤ l and a positive integer t such that the tuple (r, X, x, T, t) satisfies P 1 ∨ P 2 .
If (r, X, x, T, t) satisfies P 1 then in r at some time T ′ < T , in some partial session σ for a role A, with a signature that does not contain I, an honest agent a generates the value x to assign to the unrevealed variable X and at time T ,in some state S, I learns the value x in t steps. Clearly the secret of variable X can be broken from the point of view of role A. Actually in state S, the extension of partial session σ has a length l and a valuation v l for Kn A,l such that BasKn A,l contains X and the set R of roles of the protocol, I does not belong to the valuation v l (R) and v l (X) ∈ IntrKn S .
If (r, X, x, T, t) satisfies P 2 , in the same way let A be the role played by a in its partial session. The secret of variable X is broken from the point of view of role A. The "if" part of the Lemma is proved.
Secondly assume that in a well composed protocol, the secret of a variable X can be broken from the point of view of a role A. It means there exists a reachable state S containing a partial session σ of length l ′ for role A with valuation v l ′ for Kn A,l ′ such that BasKn A,l ′ contains X and the set R of roles of the protocol, I does not belong to the valuation v l ′ (R) and v l ′ (X) ∈ IntrKn S . Let r be a run from the initial state of the protocol to state S, let l be its length and let x = v l ′ (X). Since BasKn A,l ′ contains X it means that at some moment in the partial session σ the agent a = v l ′ (A) either generates the value x to assign to the variable X (first case) or a learns it (second case).
In the first case, let T ′ be the moment when a generates the value x. Since v l ′ (X) ∈ IntrKn S , there is a time T > T ′ when the intruder learns x in t steps, more precisely, if S i denotes the i-th state of run r, there is a state S T such that x ∈ IntrKn ST and x ∈ IntrKn ST −1 . In this first case the tuple (r, X, x, T, t) satisfies P 1 .
In the second case, in the partial session σ, a has not generated x (may be a has generated x in another session) and a has learnt the value x of X at time T ≤ l in t steps. If there exists a tuple (r, X ′ , x, T ′′ , t ′ ) satisfying P 1 , we are done. If not, then the tuple (r, X, x, T, t) satisfies P 2 . The "only if" part of the Lemma is proved.
Well composed protocols have an invariant property which is stated below not very formally:
Lemma 2. If in a trace r, at time T 1 , an honest agent a generates a value x to substitute to an unrevealed variable X in a message m that he sends with a signature S not including I, then, as long as I does not learn x, x has only occurrences in encrypted components τ = {S, . . . , x, . . .} K where the term τ has been encrypted by an honest agent belonging to S and put by this same agent in a message m ′ in which the place where is x inside τ is the place of X.
Proof. The property is true at t 1 . Let t > t 1 and assume I does not know x at t. If x is in an encrypted component, this one has been encrypted by an honest agent b, in some session otherwise, I knows x. The value x is by recurrence hypothesis for b the value of an unrevealed variable X, and then in the component encrypted by b to send in a message m ′ , x is in place of X.
4. Replace each content m with < S, m >. 5. If several terms of the protocol encrypted by the same type of key namely long term public type, long term private type, long term symmetric type or short term symmetric type have the same number of elements, add inside the term, after the signature, occurrences of the last role in order to get different numbers of elements for all the encrypted terms of the same type.
The well composed protocol of Example 2 is obtained applying this algorithm to Example 1. We now prove that the protocol P ′ one obtains applying the algorithm A to a protocol P ∈ C is in some sense equivalent to P , i.e. the new knowledge of each role is essentially the same as before, at least from the point of view of the nonces and the session keys appearing in the protocol P .
Definition 4. Let P be a protocol in the class C and P ′ = A(P ). The protocol P ′ is said weakly equivalent to P if for each role R i for each step j, BasKn Ri,j (P ′ ) = BasKn Ri,j (P ) ∪ {R 1 , ..., R n } ∪ {n} and CrKn Ri,j (P ′ ) = σ(CrKn Ri,j (P )) where the σ({τ } k ) = {< S, τ >} k for every term τ . (Notice that terms of CrKn Ri,j have an encryption depth equal to 1 for protocols in the class C).
In other terms, at every step, the basic knowledge is only increased by the set of roles and the nonce which is added, and the encrypted knowledge is the same except that the signature in inserted in the encrypted term.
Theorem 2. Let P be a protocol in the class C and P ′ = A(P ). The protocol P ′ is weakly equivalent to P and is well composed.
Proof. Recall that for every role A, Kn A,j (P ) = {B j } ∪ Anal * A ({τ j } ∪ Kn A,j−1 ) for role A if the j-th template message of his partial session is (A, B j , τ j ) or (B j , A, τ j ).
Let (A, B j , < S, {S, τ ′ j } Kpriv(A) >) resp. (B j , A, < S, {S, τ ′ j } Kpriv(Bj ) >) be the corresponding message in P ′ . We have Kn A,j (P ′ ) = {B j } ∪ Anal * A (< S, {S, τ ′ j } Kpriv (A) >) ∪ Kn A,j−1 (P ′ ), where τ ′ is obtained from τ essentially by adding the signature in every encrypted term. So by induction on j, Kn A,j (P ′ ) = BasKn A,j (P ) ∪ {R 1 , ..., R n } ∪ {N } ∪ σ(CrKn A,j (P )) where S =< N, R 1 , ..., R n >.
Remark The condition concerning the number of elements inside encrypted terms of the same type can be obtained more simply by adding different integers inside the encrypted terms which permit to identify them. Proceeding in this way, the messages will be shorter.
Conclusion
We have given a simple sufficient condition to guarantee the secrecy for cryptographic protocols which use pairing and symmetric and/or asymmetric encryption. Secrecy is ensured for an unbounded number of agents, nonces, sessions, without assuming any typing of terms. Moreover, for a large class of protocols we provide an algorithm which transforms a protocol into a secure one w.r.t. secrecy and preserves the "intended goal" of the original protocol. To our knowledge it is the first result of this type. We have limited our work to protocols of depth at most two, which is reasonable from a practical point of view. It seems that we could get rid of this restriction easily, but the proof would be more technical. A drawback of our sufficient condition is that the systematic signature of messages with the private key of the sender increases the size of the message. It would be better to replace < S, {S, m} Kpriv (A) > with < S, m, {H(S, m)} Kpriv (A) > where H is a hash function. We propose to extend our study with more primitives, in particular with hash functions.
